We analyze how firms hedge in the oil and gas industry. Our main finding is that CEO age determines hedging behavior. The probability of being a hedger as well as the use of linear hedging strategies decreases with CEO age. These results are consistent with an argument that financial distress, which sends a negative signal of managerial ability, is relatively more costly to younger CEOs. We also investigate the vega-theory of hedging instrument choice, finding some support for a negative relationship between vega and a) the use of derivatives and b) hedging strategies that include the sale of call options.
Introduction
The use of financial derivatives to manage a firm's risk profile is widespread (Bodnar, Hayt and Marston, 1998; Adam, 2009) . In spite of this, the question of how firms hedge, i.e. its choice of linear and non-linear financial instruments, has typically received much less attention in the academic literature than the corresponding question of why firms hedge. A notable exception is Adam (2009) who investigates the use of option-based hedging strategies in the gold mining industry. The results in Adam's paper show that the use of options is systematically related to a firm's financial status, consistent with the predictions of the model in Adam (2002) .
In this paper we extend this line of inquiry by analyzing if managerial risk preferences impact how firms choose between linear and non-linear hedging instruments. We capture managerial risk preferences through CEO age and the risk-taking incentives provided by the CEO's compensation contract. Previous research has shown that CEO age is related to corporate policies and risk-taking (Yim, 2013; Serfling, 2014) . CEOs face varying degrees of career risk depending on age (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Hirschleifer and Thakor, 1992; Holmstrom, 1999) , and physiological as well as psychological changes that occur with age could influence on the willingness to take risk (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003) . The power of compensation-based risk-taking incentives to explain corporate risk-taking has also attracted considerable attention in the academic literature (Tufano, 1996; Knopf et al, 2002; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al, 2006; Hayes et al, 2012) .
We first develop a hypothesis of age-related CEO hedging preferences based on an assessment of career risk. Hedging exposures to risk is typically considered to reduce the variability of the firm's payoff distribution and thereby reduce financial distress risk (e.g. Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Assuming that financial distress creates a signal of low ability, younger CEOs would prefer to hedge more because they suffer the consequences of an impaired reputation over a longer career-horizon. This conjecture is similar in spirit to the argument in Yim (2013) that younger CEOs can reap the benefits of the pay-increase that typically accompany acquisitions over a longer time-horizon. We also consider a competing hypothesis regarding the impact of CEO age on hedging behavior.
According to the 'quiet life'-hypothesis, older CEOs are more averse to financial distress-risk due to the physical and mental strain such a situation entails (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003, and Yim, 2013 , for arguments on the preference of older CEOs for the quiet life). In addition, financial distress may involve cutbacks that adversely affect an organization to which old CEOs tend to have greater psychological commitment than younger ones (Stevens, Beyer, and Trice, 1978) . The career risk-and quiet life-hypotheses have implications in terms of hedging instrument choice. Linear hedging instruments (e.g. forwards) have the highest 'hedging intensity' since they lock in the forward rate, as opposed to option-based hedging contracts, which typically have strike prices different from the forward rate and, thus, are less likely to alter the payoff distribution. Given that they are more effective in reducing variability linear contracts would be preferred by younger CEOs according to the career-risk hypothesis, whereas the quiet-life hypothesis predicts that older CEOs would prefer the linear strategy.
To generate empirical predictions with regard to compensation-based risk incentives, we apply the insights of Smith and Stulz (1985) to the choice of linear vs. non-linear hedging strategies. Smith and Stulz (1985) , who analyze how the propensity of managers to hedge can be influenced by the convexity of the compensation contract, show that a more pronounced convexity with respect to firm value (henceforth "vega" 1 ) induces a risk-seeking behavior that counteracts managers' natural risk aversion. According to the vega-theory of hedging instrument choice, managers with a convex compensation schedule would be less willing to employ hedging strategies that sacrifice upside 1 Vega is typically defined as the dollar sensitivity of managerial wealth to a small change in the volatility of the underlying asset (see Guay, 1999) .
potential, i.e. linear contracts and/or the selling of call options, because they reduce the potential windfalls from price increases in the hedgeable risk factor. According to this hypothesis, managers should display a "pecking order" of hedging preferences, in which hedging strategies are less preferred the more upside they give away. 2 We empirically test how managerial risk incentives impact hedging instrument choice using a sample of US oil and gas firms included in the S&P 1500 between 2000 and 2008. This industry is suitable for our purposes because it is comparatively homogenous, yet offers substantial variation in hedge ratios (Jin and Jorion, 2006) . Also, this industry is one of very few in which sufficient data on derivative positions is available to make a study on hedging instrument choice. Thanks to the extensive disclosure of oil and gas firms in this regard we are able to hand-collect detailed data Our main finding is that CEO age is strongly related to firms' derivative usage. CEO age is negatively related to the probability of using derivatives, as well as to the probability of employing linear hedging strategies. In our empirical model we use a rich set of governance and financial control variables that theory suggests are related to the hedging decision. Following Yim (2013) we control for the possibility that CEO age reflects the causal effect of other CEO characteristics, like financial expertise and overconfidence, which may be correlated with age. For example, CEOs who 2 A similar pecking order, but with the opposite sign, is predicted by delta, i.e. the dollar sensitivity of managerial wealth to a small change in the value of the underlying stock price. Also note that the way our argument is phrased assumes that the firm has a long position in the underlying risk factor, i.e. that it hedges its output price, though the same logic obviously applies to firms that hedge their input price.
are financial experts, either because they previously held finance-related jobs or because they have a finance-related degree, may be more inclined to use financial hedging. The findings with regard to CEO age are also robust to different model specifications. In particular, CEO age is negatively associated to the ratio of linear hedging instruments to the firm's total derivative portfolio, and to the ratio of linear hedging scaled by production. Overall, these findings provide support for the career risk-hypothesis, but contradict the quiet life-hypothesis.
We consider alternatives to the causality interpretation of the age effect. The association may simply reflect an endogenous relation. In particular, risk-averse boards could hire younger CEOs because they desire more active derivative usage. As argued by Yim (2013) , such a board-induced impact on corporate policy (in our case hedging behavior) should be most pronounced in the years following a new hiring. We show that the age effect is robust to including only long-tenured CEOs.
Moreover, following Serfling (2014), we instrument CEO age with CPI at birth and show that the age effect is even stronger.
The predictions of the vega-theory find mixed empirical support. Consistent with the predictions of the theory, vega is negatively related to the probability of using derivatives, and of using strategies that involve the selling of call options. Selling call options implies capping the upside potential with respect to the oil price, which high-vega managers have a larger incentive to preserve. However, when we restrict our analysis to hedgers, we find results that do not support the vega-theory of hedging. In fact, conditional on the decision to hedge, vega is positively related to using a linear strategy. 3 This finding is inconsistent with the vega-theory since a linear hedge gives up comparatively more upside than a collar.
This paper offers several contributions to the literature. Adam (2009) Tufano, 1996) . Our paper fills this gap. Adam (2009) finds that financially constrained firms are more likely to sell call options to finance the purchase of put options (or to finance investments in real assets). Financially unconstrained firms, on the other hand, are more likely to purchase put options financed with cash-on-hand. We find no convincing evidence in support of the theory that hedging instrument choice is driven by financial constraints. However, when interpreting this result we should keep in mind the differences in the samples analyzed.
Whereas Adam's sample consists of gold mining firms, which tend to be small and operate with modest profit margins, our sample is made up of large oil and gas firms included in the S&P 1500.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on how CEO characteristics influence corporate risktaking. In a recent paper, Serfling (2014) documents that younger CEOs take more risk.
Specifically, firms with younger CEOs invest more in R&D; make less diversifying acquisitions;
and have more operating leverage. Yim (2013) finds that younger CEOs are more prone to make acquisitions. These findings seem to confirm the general portrayal of younger CEOs as more riskseeking in the management and psychology literatures (see Yim, 2013 , for a discussion of this literature). While at first glance the results in our paper appear to disagree with these findings, a reconciliation is possible if we consider the type of risk-taking being analyzed and differences in the incentives related to each. Whereas younger managers have stronger incentives to make an acquisition early on in their career to reap the benefits from the associated pay-increase, the incentives to take substantial price risk are the opposite. If a firm experiences financial distress due to price risk, this may serve as a negative signal of managerial ability, which is relatively more costly to a younger CEO with more active years remaining and without accumulated wealth.
Another way these findings could be reconciled is by considering that it is potentially erroneous to consider the relation between CEO age and financial hedging in isolation. One possible interpretation is that younger CEOs hedge the firm's financial risk to a greater extent because they are more aggressive risk-takers in other areas. On this reading, more extensive financial hedging balances and supports the younger CEOs more aggressive risk-taking in real assets. To investigate this proposition we carry out regressions with proxies for risk-taking in real assets as dependent variables (exploration expenses, capital expenditure, and acquisition spending). We do not find any convincing evidence in support of the complementarity-argument. However, we believe the complementarity between financial and real risk-taking at the CEO level offers an interesting venue for future research on corporate risk-taking.
Finally, our findings also contribute to a growing body of research that investigates if managerial risk-taking incentives influence corporate risk-taking. Several papers have found an association between vega and various proxies for risk-taking, such as R&D, leverage, and cash holdings (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al, 2006; Hayes et al, 2012) , though other papers do not find
clear support for such a relation (e.g. Lewellen, 2006; Hayes et al. 2012) . A few papers have investigated this issue using corporate hedging as proxy for risk-taking (Tufano, 1996; Haushalter, 2000; Knopft et al., 2002; Rogers, 2002) . The evidence is best described as mixed. 4 None of these papers, however, look specifically at the hedging instrument choice. The evidence in this paper provides some support for the notion that vega is negatively associated with the use of derivatives, as predicted by the theory. In terms of the choice of hedging strategy we document a negative association between vega and the selling of call options to finance put options.
4 Tufano (1996) finds that the number of options held by managers, a somewhat crude approximation of vega, is negatively correlated with the use of hedging. Haushalter (2000) investigates similar proxies for vega in the oil and gas industry and finds conflicting results. Knopf et al (2002) , using a broad sample of firms, find no significant relation between vega and hedging. Rogers (2002) , using simultaneous equation modeling, does find the expected negative relationship between vega and hedging.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature and outlines the hypotheses related to hedging instrument choice. Section 3 introduces the sample and variables, and also provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the results from the empirical analysis of hedging instrument choice. Section 5 continues this analysis by examining alternatives to the causality interpretation of our results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Theories of hedging instrument choice

Theories based on CEO characteristics
Several theories exist relating CEO characteristics to corporate policies. One characteristic that has attracted significant attention in the literature is CEO age (see Yim, 2013 , Serfling, 2014 . Age may be systematically related to risk preferences both due to changing incentives over the CEO's career and due to changing CEO characteristics, both physiological and psychological, as the CEO gets older.
Concerns about career risk can generate potential differences in risk preferences among younger and older CEOs. In the model by Prendergast and Stole (1996) managers take greater risks to signal ability. Serfling (2014) cites anecdotal evidence that portray younger CEOs as more risk-seeking.
However, evidence from mutual fund managers and security analysts suggests younger managers display risk-averse behavior because they face greater risk of being fired following poor performance (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000 will avoid taking risks that could disrupt their financial security and social habits (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) . These considerations suggest that older CEOs would be more prone to use hedging.
In terms of hedging instrument choice, they suggest more frequent use of linear hedging instruments since these reduce variability more than collars and put strategies. In addition, linear instruments afford managers the highest degree of "planning certainty", i.e. the perceived benefits from being able to forecast cash in-and outflows more accurately over a given planning horizon.
In summary, the career risk-hypothesis suggests that younger CEOs prefer more hedging and show a preference for linear instruments, whereas the quiet-life hypothesis suggests that older CEOs 5 Linear hedging instruments are considered more hedging intense because they reduce variability in the payoffdistribution more than do option-based strategies such as collars, as the selected strike prices tend to be higher or lower compared to the prevailing forward price. As the strike prices in a collar strategy approaches the forward price the delta of the collar will converge to that of a forward contract and they will become equivalent forms of risk management. The wider the collar, the lower is the 'hedging intensity' of the position.
prefer more hedging and display a preference for linear instruments. The direction of the effect of CEO age on hedging instrument choice is therefore essentially an empirical issue.
Theories based on managerial risk-taking incentives
As noted in the introduction, Smith and Stulz (1985) were the first to formalize the idea that a firm's hedging decision is influenced by managers' risk incentives. In their theory, managers' expected utility depends on the distribution of the firm's payoffs. Furthermore, managers are risk averse, i.e. their utility is a concave function of end-of-period firm value. Due to this risk aversion, the manager's utility is maximized by hedging completely. For the manager to prefer to bear risk, she must be compensated for doing so by a higher expected income. Shareholders can accomplish this by making the manager's end-of-period wealth a convex function of firm value, for example by implementing bonuses or stock option provisions in the compensation plans.
The insights of Smith and Stulz (1985) can be restated to form a theory about firm's hedging instrument choice. Stated briefly, the theory predicts that convexity in compensation plans ("vega") will bias the manager away from hedging strategies that involve capping the upside potential in the firm's payoff distribution. We will refer to this as the vega theory of hedging instrument choice. To fix ideas on the vega theory, consider first the case of risk-neutral managers with a convex compensation scheme. Such managers prefer no hedging to hedging because it preserves maximum upside. Insurance strategies paid for using cash is preferred to financing the insurance by selling call options (a so-called "collar" strategy) because it preserves more upside. Linear strategies will be the least preferred hedging strategy because it caps upside the most. With risk-averse managers, the observed outcome will reflect the balance between "inherent" risk aversion and the risk-seeking incentives provided by vega.
While we refer to it as the vega theory of hedging instrument choice for ease of exposition, we should recall that in the theory of Smith and Stulz (1985) the sensitivity of managerial wealth to a change in the underlying firm value ("delta") is of equal importance. In contrast to vega, a high delta is normally assumed to reinforce the incentives of risk averse managers to hedge since a larger portion of their wealth is tied to the development of firm value. Empirically, delta generates predictions that are largely the inverse of vega. 
Other theories of hedging instrument choice
Adam (2002) A major conclusion in previous theoretical research on hedging instrument choice is that when the exposures are non-linear, the optimal hedging portfolio contains options (Moschini and Lapan, 1995; Brown and Toft, 2002) . This may occur when the magnitude of the exposure is uncertain, e.g. due to production risk, or when this uncertainty is correlated with price risk. However, this theory finds no support in Adam's (2009) .
Finally, hedging instrument choice may be systematically related to financial expertise. Custodio and Metzger (2013) show that financial expertise affects firms' financial policy. They find that firms that have financial experts as CEO hold less cash and use more debt. They are also more responsive to changes in business conditions than firms whose CEO does not have financial expertise. It can be argued that financial expertise could also affect the decisions regarding if and how a firm implements financial hedging. Given that financial derivatives are inherently complex instruments, financial sophistication could be expected to increase the propensity to use such instruments. This complexity-argument applies particularly to hedging strategies that involve options because the pricing and payoff structure of options is more involved. Thus, higher levels of financial sophistication would therefore be expected to be positively associated with the use of derivatives and the use of options in particular.
Sample, variables, and descriptive statistics
Our sample consists of US oil and gas firms between the years 2000 and 2008. The oil industry is generally considered ideal for studying corporate hedging because it has significant exposures to a hedgeable risk factor (i.e. the oil price); a great deal of variation in hedge ratios; and sufficiently detailed disclosure with regard to hedging activities (Jin and Jorion, 2006) . Firms are eligible for inclusion if they have SIC codes 1311 (oil exploration) or 2911 (petroleum refinement). 7 We require that 10-K reports are available from Edgar, and that firms report their derivative positions in sufficient detail to quantify the different hedging strategies. 8 The latter criterion essentially means that firms must report their hedging position in tabular form. Fortunately a large majority of firms uses this form of disclosure. Firms that report a Value-at-Risk or a sensitivity measure, which are also allowed under US accounting rules, are deleted because the information is insufficient to 7 There are very few firms with SIC-code 2911. Removing these firms from the sample does not alter any of the main results reported in Sections 4 and 5. 8 Hedging positions are identified by carefully reading the 10-Ks, as well as through a keyword search. Examples of search words are: item 7a, "hedg", derivative, market risk, swap, collar, forward, put option, volumetric.
determine the extent and type of hedging strategies. 9 We furthermore require that data on executive compensation be available in Execucomp in order to calculate delta and vega. Unfortunately, this requirement significantly reduces the number of observations available. In each year, the sample consists of approximately 40 firms. In total, the number of firm-years available is 319. Financial data are obtained from the COMPUSTAT annual industrial files.
Hedging variables
To represent hedging instrument choice we begin by calculating the nominal positions for each generic hedging strategy identified in our sample; bought put options; sold call options; linear strategies; sold put options; and bought call options. 10 Of these five, bought puts and linear strategies are the classical risk management strategies in that they give the producing firm protection against falling output prices. Linear strategies involve no upfront cash in-or outflow.
Purchases of put options are generally financed with cash-on-hand or by selling call options. The latter is typically referred to as a "collar" strategy, and is a very common strategy in the oil and gas industry (Jin and Jorion, 2006) . The firm may also finance the puts by selling puts with a lower strike price. 11 It only offers the firm downside protection down to the strike specified by the second put. It is thus somewhat speculative, since the firm is in effect betting that the second strike price level will not be reached. The firm may also sell calls in excess of the puts bought. This would tend to generate a positive financing inflow at origination, and can be considered either as a speculative position or as a means of financing investments in real assets (as outlined in Adam, 2002) . Bought call is also a speculative strategy in that the firm reinforces its long position in the oil price by creating a financial position that gains if the oil price exceeds a predetermined level.
9 Disclosure of market risks for US companies is regulated by Financial Reporting Release No. 48 ("FRR 48"), issued by SEC in 1997. 10 Linear strategies refer to hedging strategies for which the payoff is a linear function of the underlying price risk. This category includes swaps, forwards, futures, and sales agreements. 11 This is sometimes referred to as a "knockout" strategy. The knockout strategy is not mentioned in Adam (2009 In what follows, puts refer to puts bought only. Calls refer to calls sold only. 14 We use the max of calls and puts to avoid extreme values when the firm uses only a small amount of either puts or calls. When the max is used the value of the variable is bounded at 100%. Tufano (1996) argues that the "delta percentage" is the most appropriate measure of hedging activity. The delta percentage is calculated as the sensitivity (delta) of the firm's hedging portfolio to a small change in the underlying market risk being hedged, scaled by production. For our purposes, the delta percentage is not suitable because of its sensitivity to market conditions.
Because of this sensitivity, the delta percentage may be a poor characterization of hedging instrument choice, especially in a period when the underlying market risk has trended over a period of time. To understand this point, consider that a collar position at inception often is symmetric, so that the premium received from selling calls just offsets the outlay from buying put options. These positions will have similar deltas. However, at a later measurement (fiscal-year end in our case) market movements may have rendered one of the positions deeply in the money (and the other consequently deeply out of the money). If the market tends to go up, as in our sample period, this will create an upward bias on the delta of the call option, and a downward bias on the put option.
This may seriously misrepresent the original hedging instrument choice. 
Risk incentives
CEO age is the age of the CEO as obtained from Execucomp. To capture compensation-based CEO risk incentives we follow the literature and use delta and vega. The computation of delta and vega follows Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (2002) . We use the Black and Scholes option-valuation model (1973) modified to take dividends into account (Merton, 1973) . Delta is defined as the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in the firm's stock price. Vega is defined as the dollar change in CEO wealth from a 1% change in the volatility of the firm's stock price. We limit the vega calculation to managers' portfolio of share options. Potentially vega is influenced by the option characteristic of the stock itself, which arises due to the limited liability of shareholders.
However, Guay (1999) shows that the contribution to total vega from share vega is very small. In the regression analysis, we use the log of vega and delta to reduce concerns due to asymmetric distribution of these variables.
Other variables
Our control variables are largely drawn from the literatures on managerial risk-taking incentives (e.g. Carter et al, 2006) and corporate hedging (e.g. Adam, 2009) . Additional details are provided in the appendix to this paper. Cash compensation is the salary and bonus in the fiscal year. According to Guay (1999) this variable proxies for the degree of diversification on part of the manager since a large cash component means that the managers has more money to invest in assets outside the firm. 16 Duality is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm's CEO is also chairman of the board. A CEO that is also the chairman signals entrenchment, which suggest less need for hedging since the manager is at less risk of being replaced in the event of financial distress. Overconfidence is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the CEO is identified as overconfident based on a similar methodology as in Tate (2005, 2008) . In a hedging context, overconfidence could translate into an increased propensity to hedge out of a conviction to "beat the market". Assets is the total assets at fiscal-year-end. Previous research has shown that large firms tend to use derivatives more (e.g. Haushalter, 2000) . Capex is the log of the ratio between investment in fixed assets and net property, plant, and equipment. In the literature on corporate hedging, firms that have a high investment rate are normally assumed to have a higher incentive to hedge since shortfalls of internal funds will be relatively more costly (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993 ). Tobin's Q is defined as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt, divided by the book value of assets. Similar to the investment rate, this variable suggests more attractive investment opportunities and a higher cost of cash shortfalls (and by extension a higher propensity to hedge).
Leverage is total debt scaled by total assets. Highly leveraged firms are usually considered to have higher expected costs of financial distress, which provides an incentive to use hedging (Smith and Stulz, 1985) . Dividend dummy is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm pays a cash dividend.
This variable is typically used as a measure of access to capital markets, on the logic that firms that are financially constrained would be reluctant to pay a dividend (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Pedersen, 1988 The implication for vega from this shock was that a large number of share options were exercised by managers, and those that were kept ended up deep in-the-money. Both these facts served to reduce vega.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] Table 2 reports summary statistics for the hedging variables. Table 2 shows that derivatives are used in 83% of firm-years. This is a similar percentage as in Jin and Jorion (2006) , who identify 81% of firms as derivative users. At above 50%, the usage of options is much higher than in Haushalter (2000), who reports that around 10% of his sample of oil and gas firms use options. Two explanations for this stand out. The first is that option usage has continued to grow over time (Haushalters sample covers the years 1992-1994). The second is that the average size of firms in our sample is larger than in the one used by Haushalter (2000) , whose sample consists of 100 firms.
Larger firms are known to be more frequent users of hedging. Of the more speculative strategies, selling put options is the most common, occurring in 10% of firm-years. Buying call options occurs infrequently (1%). 
Results
Determinants of the decision to hedge
In this section we analyze the determinants of the decision to hedge. Table 4 reports the results from estimating a probit model where the dependent is Hedger (Model I). Table 4 also reports the results from probit estimations of the likelihood of using a linear hedging strategy (Linear Base, Model II); using a hedging strategy that involves the capping of upside potential (Lost Upside, Model III) and the probability of using a strategy of selling put options (Sold Put, Model IV); the strategy of buying puts (Bought put, Model V); and the strategy of selling call options (Sold Call, Model VI).
[INSERT Table 4 indicates that CEO age is negatively associated with the decision to hedge, and to the decision to use linear hedging strategies. These results are significant at the 10% and 1% levels respectively (Panel A). This gives some early indications in support of the career risk-hypothesis discussed in Section 2. Vega is negatively associated with the decision to use derivatives, consistent with the prediction of the vega theory, according to which high-vega managers prefer to remain unhedged because this strategy preserves maximum upside potential. Also consistent with the theory, vega appears to be negatively related to hedging strategies that involve the selling of call options.
The coefficients in Model 1 are comparable to a large literature studying the determinants of corporate hedging. According to Model 1 the decision to hedge is positively related to size, which is consistent with previous research (see Jankensgård, 2014) . The coefficient on Tobin's Q is positive, indicating that firms that investors award a higher valuation are associated with more hedging. Such an association has been identified in the majority of previous studies (e.g. Allayannis and Weston, 2001 ). Cash reserves are negatively correlated with the hedging decision, supporting the idea that cash holdings are an alternative way of managing risk which reduces the need for financial derivatives. Overconfidence has a negative coefficient, which contradicts the notion that overconfident managers are more prone to use derivatives speculatively. Cash compensation too has a negative coefficient, suggesting that well-diversified managers engage less in hedging. 20 The coefficient on proved reserves is negative, consistent with an interpretation that reserves increases 20 Even if cash compensation is taken to represent managerial entrenchment the result is consistent: more entrenched managers have less need to hedge because they are less exposed to the risk of being fired.
the collateral value of assets and thus less need for hedging. Only the negative sign on Capex is contrary to expectations.
Determinants of derivative instrument choice
In this section we analyze if hedging instrument choice is explained by CEO age and compensationbased risk-incentives. Table 5 reports the result from a set of multinomial logit regressions. Again, these variables differ from those reported in Table 4 in that they constitute dominant strategies, meaning they make up 50% or more of the total derivative position. In Model [
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
In Model 1 in Table 5 we see that CEO age is negatively related to Linear dominant (significantly at the 5%-level). In Model 2 we again obtain that the use of linear hedging strategies is negatively and significantly related to CEO age. These results strongly suggest that firms with younger CEOs are more likely to employ a linear hedging strategy. This is in keeping with the career risk-hypothesis from section 2, but is inconsistent with the quiet life-hypothesis. It should be noted that we obtain these results controlling for the possibility that younger CEO's, on account of a higher financial sophistication and openness to complex hedging arrangements, tend towards more sophisticated hedging strategies, i.e. those involving options.
Reflecting that firms with high-vega managers tend to hedge less, Model 1 shows that vega is negatively related to collar strategies. However, in Model 2, comparing linear vs. collar strategies, we see that a higher vega increases the likelihood of choosing a linear strategy. The latter finding is inconsistent with the prediction of the vega theory, which holds that, since they surrender the most upside potential, high-vega managers would eschew linear hedging strategies.
For robustness, following Adam (2009) , Table 6 Table 6 .
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
As a further robustness check we allow Sold call dominant to enter the multinomial reported in Table 5 . 21 Sold call dominant takes the value 1 if the firm sells call in excess of the amount of puts bought in a regular collar. The results with regard to CEO age and the use of a linear hedging strategy are unaffected by this change in the model specification. Further support for the importance of CEO age as a determinant of hedging instrument choice come from untabulated regressions in which we deflate the number or linear contracts with the firm's production (expressed as the number of barrels of oil equivalents produced in the fiscal year). CEO age is again significant (at the 10%-level) with a negative sign, indicating that younger CEOs are more inclined to use this hedging strategy. 21 All untabulated results in this paper are available from the authors upon request.
The results reported in this section lend no clear support to the hypothesis that hedging instrument choice is driven by financial status (as outlined in Adam, 2002) . Indicators of financial statusleverage, dividends and cash -generally lack explanatory power. 22
CEO age and investments in real assets
Considered in isolation, our findings on CEO age appear to suggest that younger managers are more risk averse. We have posited that a concern about career risk could bring about a risk-averse behavior. However, the notion that younger CEOs are more risk averse seems to contradict some recent findings with regard to the effect of CEO age and risk-taking in real assets. Two recent studies find a positive relation between CEO age and various indicators of corporate risk-taking (Yim, 2013 , Serfling, 2014 . One way to reconcile these findings with our results is simply to argue that financial hedging and risk-taking in real assets measure different aspects of risk, and managers can have different degrees of risk tolerance to different types of risk. For example, managers may display a risk-loving behavior when it comes to acquisitions because the permanent increase in salary that accompanies them tends to overwhelm any disutility from a higher firm risk from the acquisition (as outlined in Yim, 2013) . For financial hedging, however, the disutility to the manager from a financially distressed situation may exceed any benefit derived from remaining unhedged.
Another way to reconcile our findings with those of Yim (2013) and Serfling (2014) is to argue that younger CEOs tend to use more financial hedging because they take more risk in terms of real assets. To investigate this complementarity-argument we replace financial hedging as the dependent variable with various proxies for real risk-taking (exploration expense, capital expenditure, and 22 In untabulated regressions we include the category Sold call dominant, which takes the value 1 if the firm sells call in excess of the amount of puts bought in a regular collar. This strategy therefore identifies "excessive" sales of call options, which generally leads to a positive cash inflow at inception (prior to considering the eventual payoffs from the hedging portfolio). Cash reserves are positively related to this strategy. While high cash holdings certainly do not unambiguously signal the absence of financial constraints, this result contradicts that selling calls is motivated by lack of liquid resources.
acquisitions). The results are reported in Table 7 . The results do not support the existence of complementarity. CEO age is not significant in explaining any of the three proxies for risk-taking in real assets.
[ INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
Alternative explanations and endogeneity
The increase in oil price during the 2005-2008 period
As To explain this shift, we note that the average financial distress risk of in the industry indeed came down significantly as the cash generation improved and conditions in the financial markets were very favorable to oil firms (Jankensgård and Andrén, 2013) . With less financial distress risk managers presumably could concentrate on establishing downside protection using put options with strike prices below the forward rate, and if they believed prices were at unsustainable levels and more likely to come down that continue up, selling calls would have appeared as a cheap way to finance the put options. Serfling (2014) . The variable has a strong negative correlation with CEO age, 25 and it is very unlikely that the CPI in the year when the CEO was born is correlated with current firm hedging policy, except through its relation with the CEO's age. Table 9 In column I, we use the predicted value of the first stage regression as instrument, obtaining a negative and significant coefficient for the linear strategy. In Column II, we include the original age variable and the residuals of the first stage regressions. Following the Rivers and Vuong (1988) approach, a significant coefficient for the residuals would mean that the correlation of the errors among the two regressions (the first and the second stage regressions) is significant and the endogeneity problem is highly relevant. While the log of age remains negative and highly significant for the linear strategy, we do not find significant 24 Consumer Price Index data (Consumer Price Index -All Urban Consumers ) are from the Bureau of Labor Statitistics. US Department of Labor. 25 We find evidence of this negative and significant relationship in all the first-stage regressions, whose results are untabulated for sake of brevity.
coefficients for the residuals, alleviating endogeneity concerns. Panel C presents estimates of random effects Tobit model regressions evaluating the determinants of the extent of choosing different options strategies. In these models, the predicted values of Ln(Age) from the first-stage regression is used in the regressions instead of ln(Age). Results closely mirror those in Table 6 .
Finally, in Panel D, we replicate Table 7 using IV OLS regressions. Results for real corporate investments are also similar to those presented in the main analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
Long-tenured CEOs
As discussed in the previous section, the age-hedging relation may reflect the selection of young
CEOs by firms that want to hedge, instead of the decisions of young CEOs. To put it another way, firms that prefer a higher derivatives usage may decide to appoint a young CEO. As argued by Yim (2013), this effect should be more pronounced in the years close to the hiring. Therefore, in Table   10 we exclude observations where the CEO has three or fewer years of tenure to verify whether the effect persists. Both Panel A (probability of using a certain hedging strategy) and Panel B (extent of using hedging strategies) show that the relation between age and hedging persists even if we consider only long-tenured CEOs.
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]
Conclusions
In this paper we add to the literature on how firm's hedge. Previous empirical research on hedging instrument choice has only tested theories related to firm's financial status and production uncertainty. We investigate two dimensions of managerial risk preferences: CEO age and risk incentives as provided by managers' compensation plans (measured by vega). In our empirical analysis we benefit from a unique, hand-collected dataset of hedging positions in the US oil and gas industry between 2000 and 2008.
The data provides strong support of CEO age as a determinant of hedging strategies, but only mixed support for the vega theory of hedging instrument choice. The evidence suggests that younger
CEOs are more likely to hedge, and to prefer linear hedging strategies. We carry out an IVapproach and reach similar conclusions. In fact, the results are robust across a large set of model specifications and definitions of hedging instrument choice.
The findings presented in this paper may seem to run counter to the general perception of young CEOs as more prone to take risks, as well as recent research suggesting the same. We investigate a potential way to reconcile our findings with this view, namely that younger CEOs use financial hedging more because they are more active risk-takers when it comes to real assets. The evidence does not bear out the complementarity-hypothesis. Though more research is needed on the connection between real and financial risk-taking at the CEO-level, we believe a more promising path is to carefully analyze differences in CEO incentives related to different types of risk-taking.
Whereas younger CEOs have relatively stronger incentives to, say, make acquisitions and benefit from the associated pay-rise, younger managers are also more incentivized to hedge against the risk of financial distress. Since financial distress sends a negative signal of managerial ability, younger
CEOs have a greater incentive to avoid it because they suffer the consequences of such a signal over a longer career-horizon. 
Figure 1 -Hedging instrument choice over time
The figure shows how hedging instrument choice evolved over time for our sample of US oil and gas firms between 2000 and 2008. All hedging strategies are expressed as a fraction of the total hedging observations in that year. The categories are mutually exclusive and each firm-year is classified to belong to a particular strategy if that strategy is the dominant (i.e. largest) in the firm's portfolio of derivatives in that year. 
CEO Variables Cash Compensation
(ExecuComp data item TCC). It includes salary and bonus in the fiscal year.
CEO Age
It is the age of the CEO from ExecuComp.
CPI at Birth
Consumer price index in the year when the CEO was born. Data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor.
Tenure
Number of years since the CEO took office Delta
The change in the dollar value of the CEO wealth for a one percentage point change in stock price at the end of the fiscal year.
Duality
Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the roles of CEO and Chairman of the board are not split, 0 otherwise. The variable is created using data from RiskMetrics Overconfidence Binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the CEO is identified as overconfident, 0 otherwise. A CEO is overconfident if she postpones the exercise of vested options that are at least 67% in the money. Overconfidence is measured for every sample year. Firstly, for each CEO-year, the total realizable value of the options is divided by the number of options held by the CEO to determine the average realizable value per option. The strike price is calculated as the fiscal year-end stock price minus the average realizable value. The average moneyness of the options is then calculated as the stock price divided by the estimated strike price minus one. Only the vested options held by the CEO are included in the computation. The variable is created using data from ExecuComp.
Vega
Vega is the change in the dollar value of the CEO wealth for a one percentage change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns at the end of the fiscal year.
Financial Expertise
CEO who has past experience in either banking or investment firms, in a finance-related role (Accountant, CFO, Treasurer, or VP of Finance), or in an auditing firm.
Financial Eduation
Binary variable that takes value 1 if the CEO has a MBA degree or any degree in Economics, Finance, or Accouting.
Firm Variables Assets
The firm total assets at the fiscal year-end (AT).
Ln(Capex/PPE)
The ratio between capital expenditures and net property plant and equipment at the fiscal year-end (CAPX/PPENT).
Cash reserves
Cash and cash equivalent (CHE), scaled by total assets (AT)
Dividend Dummy
Binary variable that equals one if a firm paid cash dividends (DVT) during a fiscal year and zero otherwise Leverage Total debt, scaled by total assets: (DLTT + DLC)/AT
Proved Reserves
Total proved reserves of oil (OGTPROIL)
Tobin Q
The market value of equity (PRCC times CSHO) plus total assets (AT) minus the book value of equity (ceq+txdb), divided by total assets (AT).
